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but No Well-Being at All, Journal of Applied Philosophy (2013) which has been published in final form
at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12013/abstract

ABSTRACT.
Some believe that the harm or benefit of existence is assessed by
comparing a person’s actual state of well-being with the level of well-being they would
have had had they never existed. This approach relies on ascribing a state or level of
well-being to “nonexistent people,” which seems a peculiar practice: how can we
attribute well-being to a “nonexistent person”? To explain away this oddity, some have
argued that because no properties of well-being can be attributed to “nonexistent people”
such people may be ascribed a neutral or zero level of well-being, setting the baseline for
comparatively assessing the harm or benefit of coming into existence. However, this line
of argumentation conflates the category of having zero well-being with the category of
having no well-being. No Ф, unlike a zero level of Ф, is not comparable to levels of Ф –
neutral, positive, or negative. Considering the nature of well-being and the fact that
“nonexistent people” cannot (metaphysically or conceptually) have well-being
determinative properties, it follows that “nonexistent people” have no well-being rather
than zero well-being.

1. Introduction
My aim here is to reject the notion that “nonexistent people” have any level of well-being,
including a zero or neutral level. The significance of whether or not “nonexistent people”
have a state of well-being prominently arises in the context of assessing whether being
brought into existence can be harmful or beneficial and whether existence-determinative
actions and events can harm or benefit those individuals they bring into existence.
The leading method for approaching such an assessment relies on the prevalent
comparison-based conception of harm, under which act or event y, taking place at time t1,
harms person Q only if y causes (or allows) Q to be worse off at some later time t2 than Q
would have been at t2 had y not taken place. Assessing harm and benefit requires,
therefore, comparing the well-being of an individual in two states of affairs: one in which
the action or event (y) takes place and one in which it does not. By assessing and
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comparing that person’s well-being in both states of affairs, we determine whether the
action or event improved or worsened that individual’s overall lot, thereby concluding
whether the act or event harmed or benefited that person.
When employed for the purpose of assessing the value of existence and of the
harmfulness and benefit of existence-determinative actions and events, the comparisonbased conception of harm and benefit requires that we compare the well-being of the
person who was brought into existence in two states of affairs: one in which the existencedeterminative event took place – and hence the person was brought into existence – and a
second in which the existence-determinative event did not take place – and hence the
person was never brought into existence. In order to yield a result, this method for
assessing the harm/benefit of existence-determinative actions and events (for those they
bring into existence) must assume that “nonexistent people” have a state of well-being.
It is important to point out that existence-determinative events neither harm nor
benefit the person they bring into existence by affecting some particular aspect of that
person’s life, be the effect positive or negative. Rather, such events function as necessary
causal conditions for that person’s very existence. The object of assessment is, therefore,
not any particular moment or aspect of one’s life but rather the overall value one’s existence
has for one, which is assessed in relation to the overall value of one’s life. In other words,
we look to a person’s well-being: to how well his or her life is going (or has gone) overall.
Under such a comparison-based approach to harm, if a person is deemed overall better off
existing than not (i.e., existing as she is and having the life she has) it follows that the
existence-determinative acts and events in her prenatal or preconception past benefited her.
In contrast, if a person would have been overall better off not existing than existing (as she
is), such acts and events harmed her.
2. The Attribution Problem
The difficulty in applying a comparison-based analysis of harm to assessing the harmfulness
of an existence-determinative event (y) is clear: the person whose well-being we are trying
to measure only exists in the actual world, in which act or event y takes place; person Q does
not exist in the world in which y has not taken place. How can we compare the state of Q’s
well-being in the actual world with her well-being in a possible world in which she does not
exist? It seems that we cannot. As John Broome puts it, “…if she had never lived, there
would have been no her for it to be worse for, so it could not have been worse for her.”1
David Heyd refers to the notion of comparing life with “non-life” as absurd and argues that
it does not make sense.2 The existence of the person whose state of being better or worse
off is under assessment appears a necessary condition for making the comparison. And
“nonexistent people” obviously do not exist. This difficulty is sometimes referred to as the
“attribution problem.”3
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According to the attribution problem a (theoretical) person Q, who does not, never
has, and never will exist, simply cannot have a state of well-being. Well-being is always
attributed to some Q, and in the case of individuals to someone. In a world in which Q
never exists the idea of a state of well-being of Q (in that world) is muddled.
The implication of the attribution argument for the comparative approach to
assessing and conceptualizing the harm/benefit of existence is devastating. Without the
ability to assess or even make sense of the idea of how a person fares when s/he does not
exist, we cannot speak meaningfully of the value of existence or of being brought into
existence in terms of making a person better or worse off than s/he would have been
otherwise. Therefore, it seems to follow that under a comparison-based conception of
harm, existence-determinative actions and events never harm nor benefit the people they
bring into existence; regardless of the value those individuals’ actual lives have for them.
Not everyone agrees, however, with these implications of the attribution problem.
In what follows I introduce (section 2) and reject (section 3) one such approach designed
to demonstrate that “nonexistent people” do have a state of well-being, namely a zero or
neutral level of well-being.4 My aim is to protect the position that “nonexistent people”
do not have a level of well-being, and by extension to defend the notion that under a
comparative conception of harm being brought into existence never harms nor benefits
one. To clarify, I do not ascribe to the view that existence-determinative actions and
events never harm or benefit those they bring into existence, only that such harm is not
captured within an approach based on assessing harm in the comparative terms of making
those individuals brought into existence better or worse off.5
3. The Argument for Ascribing “Nonexistent People” With a Zero Level of WellBeing
There is considerable support in the literature for the position that nonexistence entails a
zero level of well-being. Several philosophers have argued for this view,6 as have some
legal theorists attempting to set a baseline for assessing the harmfulness of coming into
existence as a tool for determining the harm/damages involved in legal claims, such as
“wrongful life” claims.7
For example, Krister Bykvist considers an approach (which he later rejects)
according to which the state of nonexistence has neutral value for “nonexistent people”
because being “‘neutral for’ only expresses the mere lack or absence of any instantiation
of the relation of being good for and being bad for,” and because nothing is neither good
for nor bad for “nonexistent people,” everything has neutral value for “them.”8 Here the
fact that “nonexistent people” lack any well-being determinative properties is exactly the
reason for ascribing “them” with zero well-being.
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The argument for ascribing “nonexistent people” with a level of well-being –
namely a zero level of well-being – may even profess to accept the attribution argument: it
is exactly because no properties vest in “nonexistent people” (after all, there is no “one” in
whom properties may vest) that “nonexistent people” have zero well-being (in the world
in which “they” do not exist). Well-being is a function of having certain properties and
lacking others, and where no well-being-determinative properties vest at all there is zero
well-being. Here it is not some constellation of well-being-determinative properties that
“adds up” to neutral or zero well-being – as is the case of an actual person whose life
happens to be overall neither good nor bad – but rather it is the lack of any well-beingdeterminative properties that entails zero well-being. In this approach, ascribing
“nonexistent people” with zero well-being supposedly does not attribute any property to
“them” – as is the case of the actual person whose life is of neutral value overall – but is
merely a function of “nonexistent people” having no well-being determinative properties
at all (at least not in the world in which “they” do not exist). Thus, having zero well-being
is not a property a “nonexistent person” has but a product of the lack of well-beingdeterminative properties. According to this line of reasoning the attribution argument
does not pose a problem for ascribing a zero level of well-being to “nonexistent people,”
because in doing so we do not ascribe “nonexistent people” with any property (in the
world in which “they” do not exist). As Melinda Roberts puts this point
…when we say that Nora [a “nonexistent person”] has zero well-being at B,
we should eschew the idea that we are attributing to her the property of having
at B some level of well-being: be it a negative, positive or zero level of wellbeing. We are, rather, denying that she has at B any properties at all. Since
Nora has no properties at B at all, all the properties – that empty set – that she
does have at B add up [to] a zero level of well-being.9
At this juncture the proponent of the attribution argument may object to the
ascription of zero well-being to “nonexistent people” on the grounds that it runs afoul of
the attribution argument. Because claiming that a “nonexistent person” has zero wellbeing is, in and of itself, an ascription of a property to that “person.” Namely the property
of “having zero well-being.” And according to the attribution argument it is
metaphysically impossible to ascribe “nonexistent people” with any properties
whatsoever, certainly not in the world in which “they” do not exist.
But even if the view that “nonexistent people” have zero well-being amounts to
ascribing “nonexistent people” with the property of having some well-being (in the world
in which “they” do not exist), the rejection of this view on the grounds of failure in
attribution is too quick. The disagreement may arise not from the fact that one party does
not fully appreciates the breath of the attribution argument, but rather from a divergence in
deeper metaphysical commitments. In fact, one way to frame the disagreement between
4

those who believe that “nonexistent people” have zero well-being and those committed –
on the grounds of the failure in attribution – to the view that “nonexistent people” have no
well-being at all, is in the terms of the broader metaphysical divide between actualism and
possibilism.
The attribution argument assumes actualism, according to which “[i]f an individual
exemplifies a property or stands in a relation in a world, it must exist (i.e., be actual) in
this world.” 10 Thus, if Q does not exist in some world then Q neither has any properties
nor stands in any relation in that world. Actualism, therefore, disallows ascribing any
properties whatsoever – including zero well-being – to “nonexistent people.”
But while actualism is a leading position in the metaphysics of modality, it is not
uncontroversial.11 Possibilists hold that possible entities – even if non-actual or
nonexistent – may nevertheless have certain properties and relations even in the world in
which “they” do not exist.12 In fact, it is not implausible to read Roberts’ claim that
“nonexistent people” have zero well-being as assuming a rejection of the actualism
imbedded in the attribution argument in favor of some form of possibilism. According to
such a view, while “nonexistent people” may lack any and all well-being determinative
properties (in the world in which “they” do not exist), we may still ascribe “them” with
certain other properties, such as with the property of having zero well-being (which is
supposedly what a complete lack in well-being determinative properties amounts to).
For our purposes, thankfully, we may sidestep these deep metaphysical issues. My
position against the ascription of zero well-being to “nonexistent people” does not rely on
taking sides in the age-old metaphysical debate between actualists and possibilists. Unlike
the argument from attribution, my argument relies on the nature of well-being and not on
an actualist assumption concerning the nature of nonexistent entities. This essay aims to
defend the implications of the attribution argument from its critics without committing to
the attribution argument’s potentially controversial metaphysical assumptions. Thus, what
I must demonstrate is that “nonexistent-people” do not have zero well-being regardless of
whether or not actualism is correct.
4. Why “Nonexistent People” Do Not Have Zero Well-Being But Rather No WellBeing at All
A person has various properties that are determinative of his or her state of well-being.
For example, one may have meaning in life, be moderately successful in one’s endeavors,
have good friends and valuable relationships, suffer from some malady etc. All these and
other relevant properties and how these various properties “hang together” form the state
of one’s well-being. In some cases the relation between “negative” and “positive” wellbeing-determinative properties may cancel each other out or create, in conjunction, a life
that is of neutral or zero well-being. The position that “nonexistent people” have zero
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well-being is based on the problematic notion that a lack of any well-being-determinative
properties similarly must culminate in a state of zero or neutral well-being. What is
confused here is thinking that having none of the type of properties that determine wellbeing necessarily culminates in a zero or neutral level of well-being rather than in no wellbeing at all. I will argue that it is a mistake to treat the case of the “nonexistent person”
similarly to that of an actual person whose state of well-being happens to turn out neutral.
Scales that measure different degrees of some Ф do not necessarily denote a zero
level of Ф in cases in which no Ф-determinative factors vest at all. Rather, where an
object does not have any Ф-determinative properties, the Ф scale often simply does not
apply to that object, entailing that Q has no Ф. The significance of distinguishing between
“zero Ф” and “no Ф” for a comparative conception of harm and benefit is that zero Ф is
comparable to other states of Ф – such as positive or negative Ф – while no Ф is
incomparable with any state of Ф. While in the first case we are in a position to compare
different levels of Ф in the second case we have one level of Ф with nothing to compare it
to.
The view that any case of no Ф-determinative properties is a case of zero Ф (rather
than of no Ф) commits one to some unnatural locutions. Consider, for example, the notion
of a rock’s IQ. Personal intelligence is understood as a function of various intelligencedeterminative properties, such as the ability to solve problems, to think critically,
abstractly, quickly, insightfully etc. Does an entity such as a rock, which does not possess
any of these cognitive abilities (at whatever level or quality, since it cannot think or feel at
all), have an IQ of zero? Or rather perhaps IQ (or any other scale for measuring
intelligence) simply does not apply to rocks (as we know rocks to be)? Because rocks
lack any properties determinative of having any level of IQ, the position committed to
ascribing zero Ф to all entities that lack all Ф-determinative properties appears committed,
at least on its face, to accepting that rocks have zero IQ. Under this view the “intelligence
of a rock” is comparable to the intelligence of, for example, persons. Allowing for such
comparisons opens the door for some very peculiar locutions, such as: “this rock is not as
smart as that boy” or “all rocks are equally dim.”
Adopting the distinction between the state of zero Ф – which is commensurate
with and open to comparison with other levels of Ф – and no Ф – which is not on a scale
of Ф and therefore not open for such comparisons – dissolves unintelligible comparisons
such as that between the intelligence of a rock and a person. Accepting that rocks have no
IQ – as opposed to a zero IQ – clarifies that rocks simply cannot be assessed in terms of
IQ.
A second example is the measuring of profit and loss. A corporation that spent or
lost as much as it earned will end the quarter with zero profits. However, do all
6

“nonexistent entities,” which obviously have neither income nor any expenses, end each
quarter with zero profit? Does the fact that attributing profit and loss as a function of the
balance of transactions allow us to claim that an entity, which has no financial activity
whatsoever, has a level of profit and loss? I think not. The terms “loss” and “profit,” as
well as the scale used to measure them, simply do not apply in the case of entities that do
not generate income or incur expenses at all. A “nonexistent entity” does not generate
more or fewer profits than an actual corporation, but rather “it” simply has no level of loss
and profit.
Of course the examples of the “intelligent rock” or of the “profitless nonexistent
corporation” do not prove that for every Q the lack of Ф-determinative properties denotes
having no level of Ф rather than having a zero level of Ф. Perhaps there are cases wherein
the lack of Ф-determinative properties does amount to a zero level of Ф. What the
examples do demonstrate, however, is that at least on occasion the category of “no level of
Ф” better captures instances of Q having no Ф-determinative properties than the category
of “zero level of Ф.”
Broome has apparently expressed the position (in personal communication with
Holtug) that having zero value is not the same as having no value, claiming that logic has
no temperature colder than the ocean.13 Holtug accepts Broome’s example on the grounds
that it is sensible to ascribe temperature only to objects that have certain molecular
properties that allow for having temperature.14 However, Holtug argues that Broome’s
example is not analogous to the ascription of well-being to “nonexistent people” because
“there are cases in which it is the absence of certain (positive) properties that makes an
ascription of zero value correct.”15 Perhaps Holtug is right that at times a lack of certain
properties can entail that a person has zero well-being. But that is neither here nor there,
because the issue for us is not whether there are occasions wherein the lack of properties
amounts to a person having zero well-being but rather whether this is ever the case for
“nonexistent people.”
So when does Q, who lacks all Ф-determinative properties, have zero Ф and when
does Q have no Ф at all? A partial answer is to articulate a conditional for when Q – who
lacks any Ф-determinative properties – may have zero Ф. That is, a condition for the
applicability of Ф to any Q that has no Ф-determinative properties. I believe that Q being
able to or being the sort of entity that can have Ф-determinative properties is such a
condition. Where Q not only does not have the properties determinative of some level of
Ф, but also is incapable (in the relevant sense) of having such properties, it seems false to
relate any level of Ф to Q, including a zero level. In such cases the appropriate category
to describe Q in terms of Ф is that Q as “no Ф” at all. An entity incapable of having any
Ф-determinative properties is simply not the sort of entity that can have any level of Ф,
including zero. The Ф metric or scale simply does not apply to such an entity.
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Accepting this conditional permits ruling out many odd locutions that derive from
ascribing a zero level of some Ф to a Q that has no Ф-determinative properties. Such as
“the number 5 has zero contribution to the good in the world,” “this poem has zero shades
of green,” or “modus ponens is not as cold as the Indian Ocean.” Considering that the
number five, poems, and rules of formal logic, are not the type of entities that can,
respectively, contribute to the good in the world, have shades of color, or temperature,
they have no such contribution, color, or temperature rather than a zero or neutral level.
In contrast, where Q is a type of thing that can (in the relevant sense) have Фdeterminative properties, then the lack of any such properties may entail that Q has a zero
level of Ф rather than no Ф at all. For example, if one of many backup musicians played
an entire concert with his/her electric instrument turned off, s/he could be said to have had
a zero contribution to the performance (assuming s/he did not have a negative contribution
by omission).16 Because in failing to add the sound of his/her playing to the concert the
musician’s playing made no contribution – negative or positive – to the performance. It is
because the musician could have had such a contribution that it seems permissible (and in
this case I think appropriate) to say that the musician’s playing had zero contribution to
the performance, and “zero contribution,” unlike “no contribution,” is comparable to the
contributions – be they neutral, negative, or positive – of the other musicians.
This is not to say that for any Q that can have Ф-determinative properties the lack
of any such properties necessarily constitutes a zero level of Ф rather than no Ф. I only
claim that the possibility or capacity of Q to have Ф-determinative properties is a
necessary condition for Q to have a zero level of Ф where Q has no Ф-determinative
properties. I do not claim that the capacity to have Ф-determinative properties is a
sufficient condition for having zero Ф; it remains possible for any Q that can have Фdeterminative properties yet happens to lack any such properties to have no Ф (as opposed
to zero Ф).
The nature of the modality distinguishing between a case wherein one can have Фdeterminative properties – the proposed (necessary yet not sufficient) condition for having
zero Ф – and a case wherein one cannot have Ф-determinative properties is not entirely
clear. For example, did or could have the ballplayer who stood all day in right field doing
nothing, because no balls were hit in his direction, contribute to the game? Could he have
contributed to the game? And what about the player who sat on the bench for the duration
of the game? Under some sense of the term “can” the players could have made a
contribution and under other senses they could not have.
The vagueness of the modality notwithstanding, what is clear is that the modality
of being able to have Ф-determinative properties as a condition for having a level of Ф –
positive, negative, or zero – entails or demands at least (and probably more than)
8

metaphysical or conceptual possibility, which are perhaps the broadest and least strict
modal categories. Conceivably the modal condition for the applicability of the “zero wellbeing” category (or any other level of well-being) to Q is actually stricter than mere
metaphysical or conceptual possibility, requiring for example some form of practical
possibility. Regardless, what is self-evident is that for Ф to apply to Q it must at least be
metaphysically or conceptually possible for Q to have Ф-determinative properties. In
other words, comparability and measurability in terms of Ф – even in terms of zero Ф – is
conditioned on being the sort of entity that can – at least metaphysically or conceptually –
have Ф-determinative properties.
What of the well-being of “nonexistent people”? Given that “nonexistent people”
have no well-being-determinative properties, the question is do “nonexistent people” pass
the hurdle of the modal condition for the applicability of the category of “zero wellbeing”? That is, are “nonexistent people” the sort of entity that at least metaphysically or
conceptually can have well-being determinative properties? I think not.
Well-being is a measure of a life as a whole or at least of a component (e.g., one’s
career) or a period (e.g., one’s time at university) in a life.17 The value of a life as a
whole, that is one’s well-being, depends on how various events in or relating to one’s life
aggregate and correlate to each other in forming “what might be called their narrative or
dramatic relations,”18 what is figuratively one’s “life story.” Conceiving of well-being as
a measure of the value of a life as a whole is certainly the conception of well-being
assumed in the attempt to assess the harm and benefit of existence through ascribing
“nonexistent people” with zero well-being: comparing the overall value of one’s actual
life – that is of one’s well-being – to the zero well-being one would have had had one
never existed.
“Nonexistent people” lack well-being or well-being determinative properties.
Existence or actuality is a condition for having a life. “Nonexistent people”, therefore,
obviously never have, do not, and never will live (at least not in the world in which “they”
do not exist). As we saw, well-being is a function of aspects of one’s life and is a feature
of and is conditioned on having a life. Considering this feature of well-being and seeing
that “one” who does not exist has no life, it follows that “nonexistent people” lack any and
all well-being and well-being determinative properties.
Seeing that “nonexistent people” lack well-being and well-being determinative
properties, do “nonexistent-people” have zero well-being or no well-being at all? Upon
judging “nonexistent people” against the modal condition suggested above for ascribing
zero Ф to entities that lack Ф-determinative properties, we must conclude that
“nonexistent people” do not have zero but rather no well-being at all. This is because the
reason for why “nonexistent people” lack any and all well-being and well-being
9

determinative properties is not contingent, but derives from “their” very nature as
nonexistent. It is a conceptual or metaphysical truth that life is a necessary condition for
well-being and existence is a necessary condition for a life. And as “their” moniker
stipules, a necessary and defining feature of “nonexistence people” is that “they” do not
exist. Therefore, “nonexistent people” cannot – metaphysically or conceptually – have
well-being. Accordingly, “nonexistent people” have no well-being and not zero wellbeing.
Proponents of the view that “nonexistent people” have zero well-being should
eschew the instinct to turn to possibilism for salvation. As just explained, actuality or
existence is a condition for having a life. And having a life is a feature of actual persons
(in the world in which they exist). Thus, even if actualism is a misguided view and it
turns out that people may have certain properties in a world in which “they” do not exist,
life is not one of those properties.
What about imaginary or mere possible people? Can we not say that Gandalf, the
legendary wizard of the Lord of the Rings trilogy, had a valuable life or that Voldemort,
the evil wizard of the Harry Potter series, led a miserable life? And, if so, does it not
follow that “nonexistent people” can have well-being? We may in fact refer to the wellbeing of imaginary people, saying, for example, that the Wizard Merlin led an exemplary
life. The fallacy in using practices of ascribing “life” and “well-being” to imaginary
people in support of the view that such people actually live and have well-being is that it is
a line of argument that is purely semantic, exploiting two different meanings of the terms
“life” and “well-being” than the meanings employed throughout this paper. Clearly a
mere possible or an imaginary person is not “alive” in the same sense as is an actual
person. Not surprisingly, the nature of the moral significance we ascribe to these two
types of “lives” varies drastically. The well-being deriving from the life of an actual
person is of intrinsic moral value or significance, while the well-being deriving from an
imaginary “life” lacks any such value. “Nonexistent people” do not have a life in the
world in which “they” do not exist; certainly not in the sense of the term “life” I care
about here.
Claiming that “nonexistent people” have a zero level of well-being fails as a
means for defending the comparative-based account of the harm/benefit of coming into
existence. The category of having zero Ф where there is a lack of any Ф-determinative
properties seems to presuppose at least a metaphysical or conceptual possibility of the
instantiation of such properties. “Nonexistent people” do not have zero well-being but
rather no well-being at all because “nonexistent people” categorically never live and
therefore “they” cannot – metaphysically or conceptually – have any well-beingdeterminative properties whatsoever. Well-being is for those who live, and thus for those
who exist.
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